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The SEC's Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An
Empirical Assessment
Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchardt
Congress has repeatedly expanded the authority of the SEC to pursue
violations of securities laws in proceedings adjudicated by the SEC's own
administrative law judges, most recently through the Dodd-Frank Act. We
report the resultsfrom an empirical study of SEC enforcement actions against
non-financialpublic companies to assess the impact of the Dodd-FrankAct on
the balance between civil court and administrative enforcement actions. We
show a general decline in the number of court actions and an increase in the
number of administrativeproceedingspost-Dodd-Frank.At the same time, we
show an increase in average civil penalties post-Dodd-Frankfor both court
actions and administrative proceedings involving non-financial public
companies. Companies were also more willing to cooperate with the SEC,
consistent with an increase in the SEC's leverage in administrative
proceedings.
We also provide evidence that the mix of cases the SEC brings in
administrative proceedings has changed post-Dodd-Frank. We show an
increase in the disgorgement amount and the number of years during which the
violation allegedly took place, which are two proxies for the complexity and
cost of prosecution of the alleged underlying securities law violation. At the
same time, administrative proceedings following Dodd-Frank tended to be
weaker (i.e., less likely to prevail) and less salient (i.e., less likely to garner
media attention). These findings are consistent with the SEC attempting to
maximize the monetary penalties it imposes as well as positive media attention
from its enforcement actions, while allocating its limited resources between
administrative proceedings and civil court actions in a cost-effective way.
Although we cannot measure the deterrent impact of the additional cases that
the shift to administrative proceedings has allowed the SEC to bring, it does
appear that the SEC is using administrative proceedings to expand its
enforcement efforts againstpublic companies.

t Choi is the Murray and Kathleen Bring Professor of Law, New York University.
Pritchard is the Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Thanks to Un
Kyung Park for helpful comments.
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Introduction
Who should decide whether the law has been violated? Under the
Constitution's traditional separation of powers, Article I authorizes Congress to
make the laws, and Article II charges the executive with prosecuting their
violation. Article III places the decision of whether the law has been violated in
the hands of an independent judiciary with life tenure (sometimes with the help
of a jury).' This tripartite model was championed by the Framers of the
Constitution as a bulwark of freedom. As James Madison put it in The
FederalistPapers 47, "Where the whole power of one department is exercised
by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the
2
fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted."
The advent of the New Deal swept into power Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's cadre of progressives who chafed at the restraints imposed by the
Framers' separation of powers model.3 The progressives' new science of public
administration was premised on modern society's need for expertise in
developing and implementing policy.4 Experts would run agencies, which
would promulgate regulations to rein in the abuses of a modern, complex
economy.5 Expert administrative tribunals would be better qualified than

1. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,
11,Il.
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (emphasis omitted).
3. See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices,

95 VA. L. REV. 841,842 (2009).
4. See id. at 893; Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the
Emergence ofNew Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399,417-21 (2007).

5. See Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 3, at 907.
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generalist judges to oversee the enforcement of rules that independent agencies
devised .6
Combining the functions of the legislature, executive, and judiciary in one
body seemed to directly challenge the structure of government laid down by
Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
upheld the legitimacy of independent agencies that combine the three critical
powers of government, and these agencies have become an established feature
of the administrative state. 7 The passage of time has gradually established the
independent agencies as an accepted, if not beloved, feature of modern
government.
Among the independent agencies, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") has enjoyed a relatively favorable reputation for
competence and efficiency, marred occasionally by the agency's failure to
uncover the corporate scandal du jour with sufficient alacrity. Even the SEC's
failures, however, have ultimately redounded to its benefit. Over its history, the
SEC has shown a remarkable facility to translate its failures into broader
authority. 9 After scandals, Congress has repeatedly obliged the SEC with
additional enforcement tools. Granting the regulator greater authority is a triedand-true means of showing that the legislators were "doing something" to
respond to a perceived crisis.
Nowhere has the SEC's ability to convert its failures into a wider
jurisdiction been more conspicuous than the realm of administrative
proceedings. From their modest beginnings as a means to oversee regulated
entities, administrative proceedings have gradually taken over the field of
securities law.' ° Indeed, critics now worry that the SEC may entirely abandon
enforcement actions in federal court in favor of administrative proceedings,
where it allegedly enjoys a "home court" advantage." Administrative
proceedings are decided, in the first instance, by administrative law judges
("ALJs") employed by the SEC. Congress recently expanded the SEC's
authority in administrative proceedings through the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,
allowing the SEC to impose civil penalties through its own administrative
proceedings on essentially anyone it finds to have violated the federal securities
laws. In the wake of this most recent expansion of its authority, these
6. See id. at 893.
7. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
8. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Tries To Rebuild Its Reputation, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11,
2013), http://www.wsj .com/articles/SB 10001424127887323864604579064961041032146.
9. See infra Section ll.B.
10. See Arthur F. Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC Administrative
Enforcement Proceedings, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 215, 217-18 (1980); Blake Edwards, The SEC Is
Doubling Down on Its Home Field Advantage, Report Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 14, 2016),
https://bol.bna.com/the-sec-is-doubling-down-on-its-home-field-advantage-report-says.
11. See Ryan Jones, The Fight Over Home Court: An Analysis of the SEC's Increased
Use of Administrative Proceedings, 68 S.M.U. L. REV. 507 (2015); Tyler L. Spunaugle, The SEC's
Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings: Increased Efficiency or Unconstitutional Expansion of
Agency Power?, 34 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 406 (2015).
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proceedings have been subjected
to heightened scrutiny by the media and to
2
constitutional challenges.
This Article evaluates the consequences of the expanded use of
administrative proceedings by the SEC. First, it explains the gradual erosion of
limits on the SEC's authority to proceed before administrative tribunals,
including recent failures of constitutional challenges to that authority. As the
law stands today, the SEC can pursue most sanctions for violations of the
securities laws in either federal court or in an administrative proceeding., 3 After
laying out this background, we then turn to the main focus of the Article, an
empirical examination of the SEC's shift to administrative proceedings. In
particular, we address these questions: (1) Has the SEC used its increased
leverage in administrative proceedings to increase civil penalties against public
companies, and have public companies responded with a greater willingness to
cooperate? (2) Have the expanded penalties, coupled with reduced prosecution
costs and quicker resolution times in administrative proceedings, encouraged
the SEC to pursue cases against public companies that it would not have
pursued prior to Dodd-Frank? (3) Are such cases more complex to prosecute,
such that the SEC would not find prosecution cost efficient in another forum?
(4) Do they include weaker cases in which the SEC, all other things being
equal, has a lower chance of prevailing against the defendants, such that
prosecution would not be worthwhile without the advantages of the
administrative forum? (5) Do they include less salient cases in which the SEC,
all other things being equal, has a lower chance of getting media attention?
Our empirical results show a decline in the number of court actions and an
increase in the number of administrative proceedings post-Dodd-Frank. We
also show an increase in average civil penalties post-Dodd-Frank for both court
actions and administrative proceedings. We also show greater cooperation by
companies with the SEC in connection with its enforcement actions.
Cases brought in administrative proceedings have become more complex
post-Dodd-Frank. We show an increase in the disgorgement amount and the
number of years during which the violation allegedly took place. At the same
time, administrative proceedings following Dodd-Frank tended to be weaker
(i.e., less likely to prevail) and less salient (i.e., less likely to garner media
attention). These findings are consistent with the SEC attempting to maximize
the monetary penalties it imposes as well as positive media attention from its
enforcement actions, while allocating its limited resources between
administrative proceedings and civil court actions in a cost-effective way.

12. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1); sources cited supra note
10; infra Section IIB.
13. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012).

The SEC's Shift to Administrative Proceedings
I. SEC Administrative Proceedings
A. Beginnings
Established in 1934, the SEC was charged with bringing Wall Street to
heel. 14 The agency earned its stripes early by confronting regulated entities such
5
as exchanges and utilities, often in administrative proceedings.' The agency's
first two decades were occupied with dismantling the octopus-like public utility
6
conglomerates, cutting them down to a more-readily regulated size.' Along the
way, the Supreme Court endorsed the SEC's discretion to use administrative
proceedings to develop the law. The SEC was not required to proceed through
the cumbersome process of rulemaking; it could announce new rules in the
course of administrative adjudication.17
After a fallow period in the 1950s, the SEC re-established itself in the
8
1960s as an activist agency, with a new emphasis on enforcement. The new
era began when President John F. Kennedy appointed law professor William
Cary as Chairman of the SEC.' 9 One of Cary's opening shots in revitalizing the
agency was an enforcement case brought as an administrative proceeding,
Cady, Roberts.2° In Cady, Roberts, the SEC announced a novel interpretation of
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 Rule lOb-5 is the catchall anti-fraud provision of the Exchange Act, adopted by the SEC two decades
earlier under its § 10(b) authority.22 The rule (and its § 10(b) statutory
authority) makes no mention of insider trading. Cary interpreted the rule,
however, to prohibit not only garden-variety deception relating to the purchase
or sale of securities, but also insider trading, the exploitation of confidential
information by corporate insiders.23 Cady, Roberts gave notice that in
interpreting "[the] elements [of § 10(b)] under the broad language of the antifraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid
classifications. 24 Cady, Roberts further signaled that the SEC would push the
limits of its authority to pursue highly salient enforcement matters. Nearly fifty

14. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 213-64 (3d

ed. 2003).
at218.
15. See id.
16. See id. at218-22.
17. See SEC v.Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
18. See A.C. Pritchard, Launching the Insider Trading Revolution: SEC v.Capital Gains
Research Bureau, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 33 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed.,

2013).
19. See SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 290.
20. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
21. See id.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
22. See Securities Exchange Act § 10(b).
23. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907.
24. See id. at 912.
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years of subsequent enforcement efforts have confirmed that few securities law
violations attract headlines like insider trading.
The SEC was able to adopt its interpretation of Rule lOb-5 in an
administrative proceeding because the respondent was a broker-dealer. The
brokerage firm had received inside information from one of its partners, who
happened to also serve as a director of a public company.2 6 Broker-dealers, like
investment advisers and other regulated entities, were subject to SEC
administrative proceedings from the agency's beginning. 7 The fiction was that
the regulated entity had consented to oversight by the agency, including
administrative enforcement actions, when it registered to do business in that
regulated industry. Of course, that "choice" was illusory since Congress made
it illegal to act as a broker-dealer without registering. 8
Decisions in administrative proceedings are subject to judicial oversight.
29
Initial decisions by ALJs can be appealed to the five SEC Commissioners,
and the Commission's decisions can be appealed to a federal court of appeals.3 °
That appellate review, however, is limited. The SEC's decisions are given
substantial deference by the appellate courts. Findings of fact cannot be
overturned if they are supported by "substantial evidence. 3 1 Moreover, the
SEC's legal interpretations of the securities laws may also be entitled to the
deference given to administrative agencies under the Chevron doctrine if the
statute is ambiguous.32 These procedural advantages for the SEC are a key
33
factor underlying criticism that the SEC enjoys a "home court" advantage.
Although the SEC had authority to bring administrative proceedings
against regulated entities at the time of the Cady, Roberts decision, the agency
could only seek remedial sanctions. In Cady, Roberts, for example, the partner
of the broker-dealer was suspended from trading for twenty days, and the firm
itself was not sanctioned at all. 34 More serious misbehavior, such as pump-and-

25. See Pritchard, supra note 18, at 51.
26. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907.
27. Securities Exchange Act § 15(b).
28. Securities Exchange Act § 15(a).
29. SEC Rule of Practice 410, 17 C.F.R. § 201.410 (2016).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 478-79
(1951) (applying substantial evidence standard).
32. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
33. For a more detailed explanation of these critiques, along with suggestions for reform,
see Examining U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement: Recommendations on Current
Processes and Practices, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (July 15, 2015) [hereinafter U.S. Chamber Com.],

http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/021882_SEC-Reform

FIN I .pdf.

See also Robert Anello, Addressing the SEC's Administrative "Home Court" Advantage in Enforcement
Proceedings, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2015/09/07/addressing-the-

secs-administrative-home-court-advantage-in-enforcement-proceedings/.
34. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).

The SEC's Shift to Administrative Proceedings
dump schemes, was referred to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution .
B. Expansion of SEC Authority
The SEC's authority was expanded to include punitive sanctions in the
1980s. 36 The impetus was Congress's desire to demonstrate how tough it could
be on insider trading. The first step was the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984, which gave the SEC authority to seek treble damages in insider trading
cases.37 For the first time, the agency could seek civil penalties. It could only
seek those penalties, however, in federal court. Insider trading scandals
38
continued to dominate the news in the mid-1980s. In response, Congress
39
enacted the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.
That law authorized the SEC to seek penalties against control persons of insider
traders, again only in federal court.
The big expansion in the SEC's penalty authority came two years later,
with the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990 ("Penny Stock Act"), which for the first time authorized the SEC to
°
impose money penalties in its administrative proceedings.4 That authority was
limited, however, to entities directly regulated by the SEC, such as brokerdealers, who had been subject to administrative proceedings from the
beginning. The SEC was also given more limited "cease-and-desist" authority
over non-regulated entities in its administrative proceedings, along with the
power to order disgorgement of illegally obtained gains .41 The other expansions
of power were limited to actions in federal court, such as the authority to seek
penalties against non-regulated entities 42 and to pursue orders barring persons
4
from serving as officers and directors of public companies. Thus, in federal
court, the SEC had authority to seek civil penalties against anyone violating the
securities laws, but in its own administrative proceedings, the agency could
only impose remedial sanctions on non-regulated entities. Congress was
concerned that if the SEC had the same authority in judicial and administrative
35. See Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A CriticalReview of
the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 384

(2008).
36. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered

sections of 15 U.S.C.).
37. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.
38. See Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in
the 1980s, 82 IND. L.J. 575,576 (2007).

39. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.
40. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 10 1-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
41. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-(d) (2012).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-(d)(3).
43. Id. § 78u-(d)(2).
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proceedings, the agency would have an incentive to shift to administrative
proceedings to avoid scrutiny from Article III judges."a The penalty authority
that Congress gave the SEC was sparingly used; between 1990 and 2002, the
SEC brought only four actions seeking money penalties against non-regulated
entities.45 Moreover, the penalties sought were de minimis, totaling less than $5
million. 46 The SEC did not appear to have much interest in using its limited
penalty authority.
The SEC's thirst for penalties increased exponentially after the collapse of
Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s. 47 Beginning with a $10 million
penalty assessed against Xerox in 2002,48 SEC penalties against public
corporations have skyrocketed. Since 2000, penalties have increased by at least
30% annually.49 Partially fueling the SEC's newfound enthusiasm for corporate
penalties may be the "Fair Funds" provision adopted by Congress as part of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 50 The Fair Funds provision allows the SEC to distribute
penalties obtained from wrongdoers to compensate harmed shareholders, a
politically popular initiative. 5' Maximizing monetary recovery appears to have
now become an SEC enforcement priority. At the end of fiscal year 2014, the
director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, Andrew Ceresney, was
trumpeting that his unit had "obtained orders for over $4 billion in monetary
sanctions -nearly 20% larger than our previous high." 52
C. The Dodd-FrankAct and Subsequent ConstitutionalChallenges
Congress has enthusiastically endorsed the SEC's increased use of
penalties. This is not surprising, perhaps, given that most of the amounts
collected by the SEC go to the U.S. Treasury, despite the Fair Funds provision

44. Atkins & Bondi, supra note 35, at 393-94.
45. Id. at 394.
46. Id.
47. See Jonathan Weil & John Wilke, Systemic Failure by SEC Is Seen in Enron

Debacle, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2002), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 1033944629262271233.
48. See SEC v. Xerox Corp., Litigation Release No. 17,465, 77 SEC Docket 971 (Apr.
11,2002).
49. Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC "Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly," But
What Do They Say? A CriticalAnalysis of the SEC's New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209,
209-10 (2014).
50. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012).
51. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308(a). This provision only allowed the SEC to distribute
penalties to shareholders when a court had ordered disgorgement. The SEC circumvented this restriction
by negotiating settlements including nominal disgorgement amounts in order to allow for penalties to be
distributed. See Bruce Carton, When a Dollar (of Disgorgement)Is Worth Millions, SEC. CLASS ACTION
SERV. (Dec. 3, 2004), http://scas.issproxy.com/Newsletter/isscasDecember 2004.html. The Dodd-Frank
Act eliminated the need for this pretense by deleting the requirement of disgorgement for penalties to be
included in an SEC Fair Fund.
52. Andrew Ceresney, Dir., SEC Div. of Enf't, Remarks to the American Bar
Association's
Business
Law
Section
Fall
Meeting
(Nov.
21,
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1 370543515297.
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added by Sarbanes-Oxley. 53 The SEC's role in the events leading to the
financial crisis of 2008-2009 was widely criticized, particularly its failure to
detect excessive risk-taking by large investment banks. The authority to
supervise investment banks was taken away from the SEC by the Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010, 5' but what the SEC lost in supervisory power, it gained in
enforcement authority. Most notably, the SEC gained the authority to impose
civil penalties on non-regulated entities and individuals in its administrative
proceedings." The caution that Congress showed in 1990 in expanding the
SEC's penalty authority was cast aside in 2010.56 After Dodd-Frank, the SEC
no longer needs to proceed in federal court in order to assess civil penalties.
The SEC must go to federal court only in a narrow range of circumstances,
such as when it needs emergency relief like an asset freeze or a temporary
restraining order.57 Money penalties can be pursued either in court or in an
administrative proceeding.
The SEC did not immediately shift its enforcement efforts to
administrative proceedings in response to the authority granted to it by the
Dodd-Frank Act. Administrative proceedings showed only a modest uptick
between 2011 and 2013, before a sharp increase in 2014.58 The SEC's recent
shift to administrative proceedings has not gone unchallenged, and the initial
challenges met with some success.
The first post-Dodd-Frank constitutional challenge arose in an insider
trading case. Rajat Gupta was alleged to be a co-conspirator, along with
twenty-seven others, in the Galleon Hedge Fund insider trading scandal. The
twenty-seven others were sued in federal court by the SEC; the last case,
Gupta's, was filed as an administrative proceeding. 59 Gupta filed suit in federal
court challenging the SEC's administrative proceeding against him on equal
6°
protection grounds, arguing that he was being targeted as a class of one. The
district court temporarily enjoined the administrative proceeding, holding that it
53. See Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial
Penalties, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 4, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
54. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(a), 15

U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2012) (amending § 8A of the Securities Act, § 21B(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 9(d)(l) of the Investment Company Act, and § 203(i)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act). See
also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 618 (b), 12 U.S.C. § 1850a
(granting supervisory power to the Federal Reserve).
55. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(a).
56. See id.

57. A narrow category of actions can only be brought in an administrative proceeding.
This category includes proceedings to terminate the registration of public companies for failure to file
periodic reports, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(), 15 U.S.C. 771 (2012), and "follow-on"
administrative proceeding to bar persons or entities from the securities industry, based on a prior entry
of a civil injunction or a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act § 15(b)(4). These
proceedings tend to be open-and-shut and are rarely contested.
58. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803;

infra Figure 1.

59. See In re Rajat K. Gupta, Exchange Act Release No. 63,995, 2011 WL 722394 (Mar.
11,2011).
60. Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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had jurisdiction to hear Gupta's equal protection claim. 61 Rather than having
the district court resolve the constitutional issue, the SEC backed down, refiling
62
its case against Gupta in federal court.
The SEC has stuck to its guns in subsequent cases, however, arguing that
district courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain constitutional challenges to
the agency's administrative proceedings.63 As the SEC has filed more
administrative proceedings-the "new normal" 64 -the "class of one" argument
has faded away, and defendants are now relying on Article II challenges under
the Appointments Clause.65 Article II stipulates:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint ... all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the

Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
66
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

These Article II challenges take two forms: (1) the SEC's ALJs are
"inferior officers" who must be appointed by the head of an executive
department (i.e., the SEC); and (2) the SEC's ALJs are unconstitutional
because they are insulated from oversight by the President by more than one
layer of "for-cause" removal.
The inferior officers argument is a straightforward textual argument; the
only question that needs to be answered is whether ALJs are "inferior officers"
or employees. The key Supreme Court precedent here is Freytag v.
Commissioner,67 in which the Supreme Court held that a special trial judge of
the tax court was an "inferior officer. '68 The SEC has taken the position that its
ALJs, who presently are hired in a process administered by the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, are employees rather than officers because their

61. See id. at 513-514.

62. See SEC v. Gupta, Litigation Release No. 22,140, Civil Action No. 11-CV-7566
(Oct. 26, 2011).
Finds

Itself

63. See, e.g., Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir. 2016); Peter J. Henning, SEC
in

a

Constitutional

Conundrum,

N.Y.

TIMES

(June

15,

2015),

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/business/dealbook/sec-finds-itself-in-a-constitutionalconundrum.html.
64. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J.

(Oct. 21, 2014) (quoting Kara Brockmeyer, head of the SEC's Foreign Corrupt Practice unit),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints- 1413849590.
65. Some cases have also asserted due process challenges based on the perceived
unfairness of administrative proceedings. See, e.g., SEC v. Bebo, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015)
(dismissing due process challenges for lack of jurisdiction).
66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
67. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
68. See also Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997) (holding that military
trial and appellate judges are inferior officers under the Appointments Clause).
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69
decisions are not final until they are adopted by the Commission. In addition,
the SEC reviews the decisions of its ALJs de novo. In rejecting the challenge
to its ALJs, the SEC relied on the D.C. Circuit's decision in Landry v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp.,71 which held that the FDIC's ALJs were not inferior
officers because they did not have the authority to render final decisions.
Landry itself is open to question, as the special trial judges in Freytag also
lacked the authority to enter final decisions in most cases. It is not clear how
the Supreme Court would interpret Freytag in the context of the SEC's ALJs.
As a practical matter, however, any defect in the appointment of the SEC's
ALJs can be easily corrected by having the Commissioners appoint the ALJs.
The SEC has resisted that solution, presumably because it would call into doubt
many previously-resolved cases, but Commission appointment of the ALJs
72
would eliminate that constitutional question going forward.
The second Appointments Clause issue, relating to Presidential oversight,
is also unlikely to derail the SEC's use of administrative proceedings. The
SEC's ALJs can only be removed by the Commission for "good cause," as
"established and determined" by the Merit Systems Protection Board
("MSPB"). 73 The Commissioners themselves can only be removed by the
74
President for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." The
75
same limits apply to removal of the MSPB board members by the President.
Thus, if the President wanted to remove an SEC ALJ from his or her position,
the President would face substantial obstacles.
The insulation that ALJs have from removal by the President looks a lot
like the protections previously enjoyed by the members of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") until the Supreme Court struck down
those restrictions on removal. 76 The Supreme Court had previously upheld forcause restrictions on removal of inferior officers against constitutional attack.
However, PCAOB held that two layers of for-cause restrictions-i.e., SEC
Commissioners could only be removed for cause, and PCAOB members could
only be removed for cause by SEC Commissioners-unduly infringe on
executive power.77 Although ALJs employed by independent agencies seem to
enjoy at least as much protection, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for the Court

69. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
70. Inre Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Exchange Act Release No. 75,837, 2015 WL 5172953
(Sept. 3, 2015).
71. Id. (citing Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
72. The Federal Trade Commission has already implemented this fix for its ALJs to ward
off challenges. See Alison Frankel, Unlike SEC, FTC Makes Quick Fix To Ward off ALJ Constitutional
Challenges, REUTERS BLOG (Sept. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/09/16/unlikesec-ftc-makes-quick-fix-to-ward-off-alj-constitutional-challenges.
73. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
74. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,487 (2010).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012).
76. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 477.
at 509-10.
77. See id.
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in PCAOB distinguished their situation because "unlike members of the
[PCAOB], many administrative law judges of course perform adjudicative
rather than enforcement or policymaking functions, or possess purely
recommendatory powers. 78 Justice Breyer, in dissent, challenged this
distinction, arguing that the PCAOB did perform adjudicative functions, such
as disciplining accountants and audit firms.7 9 Whatever the merits of the
distinction drawn by the majority, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would
have the collective stomach to invalidate the authority of the thousands of ALJs
who allow the modern administrative state to function. Doing so would threaten
to send a flood of trivial cases, such as Social Security benefits denials, into
federal courts.80 To avoid that headache, the Court is likely to find some form
of "adjudication exception" to the prohibition of double "for-cause" removal,
as foreshadowed in PCAOB. Alternatively, the Court could determine that the
ALJs are employees rather than inferior officers, and therefore it is permissible
to restrict their removal.
The upshot of these constitutional challenges is that they are likely to be
much ado about nothing: SEC administrative procedures are here to stay. The
weakness of the constitutional arguments bolsters the importance of the policy
question raised by the SEC's shift to administrative proceedings.
D. Policy Justificationsand Criticisms
On that policy question, Andrew Ceresney, head of the SEC's Division of
Enforcement, defended the SEC's shift in a speech delivered to the American
Bar Association. 81 He identified a number of advantages of administrative
proceedings, including faster decisions, the use of specialized factfinders, and
more flexible evidentiary rules.82 He also argued that developing the law
through the administrative process was appropriate given the expertise that
SEC Commissioners have with the securities laws and the review provided by
circuit court judges.83
The last point was an apparent response to Judge Jed Rakoff, a former
federal prosecutor, who had criticized the SEC's expanded use of
administrative proceedings.84 In Judge Rakoff's view, ALJs might be inclined

78. See id. at 507 n.10.
79. See id. at 530-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 520-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. See Ceresney, supra note 52.
82. See id.
83. See id. ("SEC commissioners have great expertise in the securities and the
administrative agency structure that Congress created leverages that expertise to help shape the law's
development.").
84. The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, PLI Securities Regulation Institute Keynote Address:
Is
the
S.E.C.
Becoming
a
Law
unto
Itself?
(Nov.
5,
2014),
http://media.jrn.com/documents/secaddress.pdf.
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85
to a "narrow, tunnel vision view of the law." Expertise might come at the
expense of independence. The deference given to SEC interpretation of the
securities law by appellate courts is also generally cited among scholars and
86
practitioners as a key feature of the SEC's purported "home court" advantage.
Other criticisms of the SEC's administrative proceedings are based on
perceived procedural unfairness to respondents 8. 7 One often-cited concern is the
tight deadlines that the SEC imposes on its ALJs. ALJs are required to issue an
initial decision within 120, 200, or 300 days from the time the Enforcement
Division files charges.88 The Division, of course, has had plenty of time to
prepare its case through both informal and formal investigation (which gives
the Division subpoena power): most investigations will last more than a year,
and several years is not uncommon. 89 Defendants must scramble to catch up
once the case is filed, as they may not know the scope of the Division's case
before receiving a Wells Notice (which typically occurs shortly before filing).90
9
Trials before ALJs typically begin about four months after filing. ' That can be
a challenging timeline if the case involves a substantial number of documents
(as is typical with the advent of electronic discovery) or requires expert
testimony. Defendants have also claimed that the minimal discovery available
in administrative proceedings limits their ability to obtain exculpatory evidence
from the SEC.92 Although defendants may be given access to the Division's
investigative file, that investigation has been shaped by the Enforcement
Division attorneys who conducted the investigation. Depositions of witnesses, a
routine part of civil litigation in federal court, are not typically available to
defendants in administrative proceedings before the SEC unless the witness
93
will not be available to testify at the administrative hearing. Although the
SEC is also unable to depose witnesses, it typically collects substantial
evidence through interviews prior to instituting the administrative proceedings.
Overall, the process is considerably more streamlined than the procedures
85. Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Rakoff Continues Crusade Against SEC Admin Courts,
LAw360, (Nov. 21, 2014 1:46 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/598561/rakoff-continues-crusade-

against-sec-admin-courts (reporting on Judge Rakoff's remarks at a panel at Columbia Law School).
86. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
87. See supra note 33.

88. SEC Rule of Practice 360(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 201.360 (2016).
89. Exchange Act § 21(a)(2).
90. A Wells Notice is a letter sent by the SEC to a party against whom the SEC plans to
bring an enforcement action. See U.S. Chamber Com., supra note 33.
91. See Amendments to the Commission's Rules of Practice, Exchange Release No.
34-78319, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-

78319.pdf.
92. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(a). See also Stephen A. Best, Paul F. Enzinna & Evan N.
Turgeon, Imposing Brady-Like Obligations on the SEC, CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR (June 2014),

http://www.brownrudnick.com/uploads/1279/doc/11514.pdf.
93. See Amendments to the Commission's Rule of Practice, supra note 91; Peter J.
Henning, A Small Step in Changing S.E.C. Administrative Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015),

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/business/dealbook/a-small-step-in-changing-sec-administrativeproceedings.html.
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followed in federal court. For simple cases, this may not afford the SEC much
of an advantage. For more complex cases, defendants may feel considerable
pressure to settle if they perceive the deck to be stacked against them in
administrative proceedings.
The SEC recently responded to the criticisms of its procedures by
amending its Rules of Practice.94 The new rules relax the deadlines for
administrative proceedings in three ways: (1) the deadline for the ALJ's initial
decision now runs from the time that the post-hearing briefing is completed,
rather than the date the proceeding was filed; 95 (2) the timing of the initial
hearing is now a range of four months to eight months after filing, rather than a
strict four months; 96 and (3) extensions of the initial decision deadline of up to
thirty days are available.97
The second change expands the availability of depositions in
administrative proceedings. The new rule allows the Division and respondents
to depose three people per side in matters involving a single respondent, and
five people in matters involving multiple respondents .98 In addition, either side
can petition the hearing officer for leave to conduct up to two additional
depositions.99 Parties can also request that the ALI issue a subpoena for
documents in conjunction with the deposition."'
The SEC's reforms blunt the most serious criticisms of the administrative
process, but they do not make administrative proceedings the equivalent of a
federal court action. The timing of these changes is no accident; they were
proposed by the SEC in the wake of the constitutional challenges to its
authority to bring cases in administrative proceedings discussed above. These
challenges may have created a public relations problem, causing the agency to
reform its procedures. The SEC may also have been anxious to head off a
legislative response. Stiffer reforms have been introduced in Congress,
including most notably a proposal to allow respondents in administrative
proceedings the option of removing their cases to federal court. 0 1 The proposed
legislation highlights the question: has Congress made the right policy choice
in giving the SEC essentially unfettered discretion in choosing between
administrative proceedings and federal court? In the next Part, we provide
empirical data relevant to that question. What has the shift to administrative
proceedings meant for SEC enforcement actions and the public companies
targeted in those actions?

94. See Amendments to the Commission's Rule of Practice, supra note 91.
95. See id. (amending SEC Rule of Practice 360(a)(2)(i)).
96. See id. (amending SEC Rule of Practice 360(a)(2)(ii)).

97. See id. (amending SEC Rule of Practice 360(a)(3)(ii)).
98. See id. (amending SEC Rule of Practice 233(a)(1)(2)).
99. See id. (amending SEC Rule of Practice 233(a)(3)).
100. See id. (amending SEC Rule of Practice 232).
101. Due Process Restoration Act of 2015, H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. (introduced on Oct.
22, 2015).
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II. Empirical Assessment of the Shift to Administrative Proceedings
A. Hypotheses
What does the SEC maximize with its enforcement choices? Assuming
that there are more securities law violations than the SEC has resources to
pursue, the SEC must choose among the cases available to it. Although the
underlying substance of a case may drive the SEC's enforcement-related
decisions, it is also possible that other factors, including the political
environment and the need to be seen as "doing something," particularly after a
financial scandal, may affect the SEC's enforcement priorities. One obvious
incentive for the SEC (at least since Sarbanes-Oxley) has been the pursuit of
monetary penalties. 2 As noted above, the SEC trumpets its financial take in its
year-end report to Congress. 0 3 The SEC depends on Congress for its funding,
°
and the agency needs to show results to support its annual budget requests.1 4 In
addition, both the SEC and Congress focus on case numbers as a metric of the
Enforcement Division's performance, so the agency has an incentive to
maximize the number of cases brought.1" 5
Sheer numbers of cases, however, may not tell the whole story, even if
large penalties are assessed; the SEC would also want to bring cases that are
highly salient and therefore likely to attract media attention. For example, the
SEC pursued backdating cases against public companies even when the
06
Insider trading is
marginal deterrent impact of those cases was attenuated.
another example; the SEC pursues such cases even when the amount of
disgorgement and penalties available is trivial.0 7 What backdating and insider
08
trading have in common is the media attention that they draw.' Violations that
are easy to understand, perhaps because of perceived abuse of trust by
violators, are also easy to condemn. Of course, penalties and salience may be
self-reinforcing: the agency may attract more headlines in cases in which it
extracts the largest settlement amounts, even for less culpable conduct.
For our analysis, we assume that the SEC seeks to maximize not only the
sheer number of cases, but also the aggregate amount of monetary penalties it
imposes, as well as positive media attention from its enforcement actions.
102. See SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2015, SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-245.html (noting the SEC

had orders totaling approximately $4.2 billion in disgorgement and penalties).
103. See id.
104. See FY 2017 CongressionalBudget Justification, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION

(2016), https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy l7congbudgjust.pdf.
105. See id.
106. See Stephen J. Choi, A.C. Pritchard & Anat C. Wiechman, Scandal Enforcement at
the SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations, 15 AM L. & ECON. REV. 542 (2013)

(examining the role of media scrutiny on the SEC's option backdating enforcement actions).
107. See, e.g., SEC v. Blackwell, Litigation Release No. 20130 (announcing
disgorgement, interest, and a penalty totaling $10,630.89) (May 25, 2007).
108. See Choi, Pritchard & Wiechman, supra note 106.
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Given this assumption, our first hypothesis is that the SEC would use its
additional enforcement powers under the Dodd-Frank Act as leverage to obtain
greater monetary penalties in administrative proceedings (the "SEC Leverage"
hypothesis). Prior to Dodd-Frank, the agency could only seek monetary
penalties against some actors in federal court.'0 9 We predict that Dodd-Frank
would increase the penalties the SEC collects in administrative proceedings by
widening the range of defendants subject to penalties. Greater leverage for the
SEC would also lead defendants in administrative proceedings to be more
willing to cooperate with the SEC in an effort to reduce sanctions. The SEC's
leverage in administrative proceedings post-Dodd-Frank also implies that
respondents may be more receptive to adopting remedial changes to their
operations. Companies cooperate on both of these dimensions in the hope of
getting a reduction in the settlement amount. Thus, the SEC Leverage
hypothesis predicts more monetary penalties and more cooperation from
defendants.
The Dodd-Frank Act may change the SEC's decision on which cases to
bring in the administrative forum. A resource-constrained SEC that seeks to
maximize its monetary penalties would weigh the expected sanction against the
cost of winning. Our second hypothesis is that post-Dodd-Frank, the SEC
would bring more complex and thus costlier-to-prosecute actions as
administrative proceedings because of the increased prospect of monetary
sanctions (the "Case Complexity" hypothesis). In complex cases, the SEC may
see administrative proceedings, which offer a quicker avenue to imposing
sanctions, as a cheaper alternative to federal court. As a result, the SEC would
be more likely to shift more complicated cases, regardless of their evidentiary
strength or salience, from civil court to administrative proceedings. In addition,
the greater prospect of monetary penalties may lead the SEC to bring more
complex and costlier-to-prosecute actions in administrative proceedings that the
SEC may not have brought at all prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, due to resource
constraints.
Our third hypothesis deals with another way the SEC may have changed
its decision on which cases to bring in the administrative forum. Under this
hypothesis, the SEC would shift toward weaker cases-in which the SEC has a
lower chance of prevailing compared with administrative proceedings in the
pre-Dodd-Frank period-or cases that are less likely to garner media attention
(the "Case Strength/Salience" hypothesis). These are cases that the SEC would
not have brought at all pre-Dodd-Frank because of the high cost of bringing
these actions relative to their benefits for the agency. Those benefits include
prospective monetary sanctions, furtherance of the SEC's enforcement
priorities because of the violation's impact on investors, and media attention.
We postulate that the SEC will be willing to bring more cases with weak
109. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2012).
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evidence of violations, marginal wrongdoing, or low salience in administrative
proceedings post-Dodd-Frank. The threat of penalties post-Dodd-Frank might
encourage respondents to settle administrative proceedings that they previously
would have been inclined to fight. That leverage would allow the SEC to
resolve these cases more economically and thus justify bringing them in the
first place. If the respondent is willing to settle, the SEC has an incentive to
bring the case to pad its enforcement numbers and penalty dollars, regardless of
its deterrent impact.
The SEC may have also shifted relatively weaker cases that it would have
brought in civil court prior to Dodd-Frank into the administrative forum after
Dodd-Frank. We assume that prior to Dodd-Frank the SEC brought its
strongest cases (i.e., cases with the best evidence or most egregious
misconduct) and/or most salient cases (i.e., cases most likely to garner media
attention) against public companies in court because penalties were available
there, whereas administrative proceedings only afforded remedial sanctions.
The categories of case strength and salience do not necessarily overlap: think of
a garden variety "pump and dump" scheme, for which the SEC's evidence will
typically be strong and the violations egregious. Because the violators are
minor figures, media attention to the SEC's enforcement efforts will typically
be scant. Obviously, such cases do have an important investor protection
rationale. In many cases, however, case strength and salience may be
congruent. Egregious misconduct generally makes for good headlines.
This leads to the prediction that if the "home court" advantage of
administrative proceedings is real, the SEC would respond to the discretion
afforded to it by Dodd-Frank by shifting (1) weaker cases and (2) less salient
cases from court into administrative proceedings. The theory is that the
administrative proceeding would either allow the SEC a better likelihood of
prevailing (important in weak cases) or allow it to prevail with fewer resources
(devoting more resources to higher-profile cases brought in federal court). This
theory is particularly applicable if the respondent is a public company, anxious
to minimize the attention brought to the case because of adverse business
consequences. 1 0 If these hypotheses are correct, a shift toward administrative
proceedings would leave a mix of stronger and more salient cases remaining in
civil court post-Dodd-Frank.
B. Data
To assess the consequences of the SEC's shift from court to
administrative proceedings, we focus on enforcement actions involving public
companies that are not financial institutions (defined as companies with
Standard Industrial Classification ("SIC") Code 6000 to 6999). Prior to the

110. See Choi, Pritchard & Wiechman, supra note 106, at 554 (examining the stock price
reactions to SEC announcements of investigations).
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Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC could impose monetary civil penalties in
administrative cease-and-desist proceedings only against registered entities
(including broker-dealers, among other financial entities) and persons
associated with these registered entities."' The Dodd-Frank Act gave the SEC
authority to impose monetary civil penalties in all administrative cease-and2
desist proceedings."
Our focus on non-financial public companies enables us to discern the
impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on SEC actions involving enforcement targets
most affected by the Act. It also allows us to examine an important potential
consequence of the SEC's enforcement efforts: Are enforcement actions filed
as administrative proceedings different from those filed in court, particularly
after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act?
To do our analysis, we began by collecting enforcement actions filed by
the SEC against public companies (other than SIC 6000s) that are tracked by
the Center for Research in Security Prices ("CRSP")." 13 We collected all cases
initiated against these companies between January 1, 2005 and December 31,
2015. We obtained information about these actions from the NYU Securities
Enforcement Empirical Database ("SEED"), the SEC's website, and
Bloomberg Law (including information from court dockets tracked in
Bloomberg Law)." 14 We started with a total of 324 SEC actions in our dataset.
We divided our dataset into two categories: civil cases filed in federal
court and administrative proceedings before ALJs. Figure 1 below shows the
trend over time of SEC enforcement actions against public companies.

111. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2012).
112. See id.
113. CRSP tracks companies that are traded on the NYSE, NYSE MKT, NASDAQ, and
ARCA exchanges.
114. The SEED database is available at Securities Enforcement Empirical Database,
N.Y.U. L. (last visited Nov. 20, 2016), http://seed.law.nyu.edu.
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Figure 1: SEC Actions Against Non-Financial Public Companies by Initiation
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We see an increase in civil actions resolved in court against public
companies through 2010 (the year Dodd-Frank was enacted), followed by a
relatively rapid decline. In 2010, we tracked twenty-seven newly initiated SEC
civil enforcement actions against public companies, while in 2015 we had only
four civil actions, a drop of 85%. This decline could be consistent with a shift
from court actions to administrative proceedings. Administrative proceedings
ebbed in 2012, before rebounding in the period of 2013 through 2015. In 2010,
we tracked nine newly initiated SEC administrative enforcement actions, while
in 2015, the last year of our data sample, we had sixteen newly initiated
administrative actions, an increase of 78%. Importantly, from 2006 to 2013, the
number of civil actions against public companies was greater than the number
of administrative proceedings. In 2014 and 2015, this relation reversed and the
number of administrative proceedings was greater than the number of civil
actions. These trends in initiated enforcement actions, however, might also
reflect changes in the SEC's mix of cases between companies and individuals.
Consequently, the raw number of filings against public companies, even though
broken down between court actions and administrative proceedings, may not
tell us too much, although the apparent decline in court actions relative to
administrative proceedings post-Dodd-Frank is suggestive.
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The Dodd-Frank Act, which gave the SEC wider penalty authority in
administrative proceedings, was passed in July 2010.15 Accordingly, to avoid
anticipation effects, we exclude SEC actions that were initiated or resolved in
2010 for our statistical analysis and divide the remaining cases into pre-DoddFrank (2005-2009) and post-Dodd-Frank (2011-2015). For our analysis, we
also drop proceedings that were commenced prior to 2010, but not completed
until after 2010 (in fact, most of the cases are filed and simultaneously settled).
The dataset for our analysis consists of a total of 338 separate SEC enforcement
actions.
C. EmpiricalResults
1. Leverage Hypothesis
Our first hypothesis is that Dodd-Frank increased the SEC's leverage with
defendants, leading to both greater monetary penalties and more willingness by
defendants to cooperate with the SEC. We examine the monetary civil penalties
assessed in these enforcement actions against public companies. Prior to DoddFrank, only entities directly regulated by the SEC (mainly broker-dealers and
other financial entities) were subject to civil penalties in administrative
proceedings; after Dodd-Frank, all public companies are included in the pool
subject to penalties. In other words, the SEC has a wider range of potential
targets for penalties in administrative proceedings after Dodd-Frank. To assess
the specific effect of Dodd-Frank, we focus on non-financial industry firms, as
defined above. Dodd-Frank had the most immediate effect on the SEC's ability
to assess monetary penalties in an administrative proceeding against those
firms. Figure 2 shows the trend in average penalties pre- and post-Dodd-Frank
for non-financial services companies.

1 5. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(a); Wall
Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, WHITE HOUSE (last visited Nov. 20, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform.
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Figure 2: SEC Average Civil Penalties for Non-Financial Public Company
Defendants
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We see that Dodd-Frank had an effect on civil penalties against public
companies in administrative proceedings. Average penalties for non-financial
firms in administrative proceedings increased from $0 in the pre-Dodd-Frank
period to $5.2 million post-Dodd-Frank. This change is statistically significant
at the 10% confidence level-not surprising, given the baseline. We also see a
$4.6 million increase in average penalties in cases filed in federal court
subsequent to Dodd-Frank. This change, however, is not statistically
significant.
We also conjecture that the wider array of sanctions available to the SEC
in administrative proceedings post-Dodd-Frank would induce cooperation from
defendants. In Figure 3,we report the percentage of cases in which the SEC
credited the corporation for cooperating with its investigation or engaging in
remediation prior to the imposition of sanctions. Although defendants in SEC
enforcement actions face pressure to cooperate or engage in remediation in all
actions, 6 we use the SEC's mention of cooperation or remediation as a proxy
for a high level of cooperation by the defendant.

116. Rebecca Files, SEC Enforcement. Does ForthrightDisclosure and Cooperation
Really Matter?, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 353,355-56(2012).
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Figure 3: Cooperation for Non-Financial Public Company Defendants
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Consistent with our hypothesis, we see a sharp increase in cooperation or
remediation by defendants in administrative proceedings post-Dodd-Frank.
Although the SEC mentioned the cooperation or remediation by the defendants
in 58% of the administrative actions prior to Dodd-Frank, the SEC mentioned
cooperation or remediation in 74% of the administrative actions post-DoddFrank. The increase is significant at the 10% confidence level. In contrast, there
is only a minimal change in the percentage of civil actions that mention
cooperation or remediation by defendants during same period; it is not
statistically significant. This evidence supports, to some extent, the view that
the SEC is wielding greater leverage when negotiating settlements in
administrative proceedings.
In addition to the increased SEC leverage, the increase in average civil
monetary penalties and the incidence of cooperation in administrative
proceedings is consistent with another explanation. The SEC may have
changed the type of cases it brought against public companies in administrative
proceedings. Such a change could involve either shifting cases that the agency
would have brought in court in the past or targeting firms for enforcement that
would not have been targeted pre-Dodd-Frank. The subsequent analysis
explores these possibilities.
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2. Case Complexity Hypothesis
Our second hypothesis is that the prospect of monetary penalties will lead
the SEC to devote a greater amount of its limited resources to prosecute
administrative proceedings, leading the SEC to bring cases involving more
complex fact patterns. The prospect of greater monetary penalties will lead the
SEC to view more of these costlier-to-prosecute cases as worthwhile postDodd-Frank. As a measure of case complexity, we look at disgorgement as a
measure of the underlying profits from the alleged securities law violation.
Violations that involve greater profits are likely to be longer running, involve
more transactions, and have participants who have invested more in avoiding
detection. All of these factors add to the SEC's burden of investigation and
presentation of evidence. Both before and after Dodd-Frank, the SEC had the
power to seek disgorgement of ill-gotten gains in both civil and administrative
proceedings. Changes in disgorgement amounts, therefore, shed light on
whether the relative complexity of cases changed post-Dodd-Frank. Figure 4
depicts the mean disgorgement amounts in millions of dollars for civil and
administrative proceedings.

Figure 4: SEC Mean Disgorgement for Non-Financial Public Company
Defendants
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Note from Figure 4 that the mean disgorgement amount increases for both
civil and administrative proceedings. The increase for civil actions of $0.4
million is not statistically significant. The increase for administrative
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proceedings is both quantitatively larger at $8.1 million and statistically
significant at the 5% confidence level. The Dodd-Frank Act corresponds with a
shift by the SEC toward bringing more actions involving greater profits in
administrative proceedings. This shift is consistent with the SEC bringing
more-complex actions-more costly to investigate and litigate-in
administrative proceedings after civil monetary penalties were made available.
Another measure of the case complexity is how long the alleged violation
persisted. A pattern of securities law violations occurring over a number of
years may pose greater evidentiary challenges than a single, discrete offense. A
long-term violation suggests that the wrongdoers have worked hard to avoid
detection or that the violation is a technical one and, therefore, non-obvious.
Ponzi schemes collapse quickly, but accounting manipulations can persist for
years. Figure 5 compares the average number of violation years for civil and
administrative actions before and after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.

Figure 5: Average Number of Violation Years for Non-Financial Public
Company Defendants
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Note from Figure 5 that the average number of violation years remains
virtually unchanged for court actions, dropping from 4.8 years to 4.6 years.
This difference is not statistically significant. In contrast, the average number
of violation years increases by 37% from 3.5 years to 4.8 years for
administrative proceedings. This difference is significant at the 5% confidence
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level. The increase in the average number of violation years for administrative
proceedings is consistent with the SEC bringing more complex and potentially
more challenging cases in administrative proceedings after the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act.
The shift by the SEC toward more complex actions in administrative
proceedings is consistent with one of two possibilities. After Dodd-Frank, the
SEC may have initiated administrative proceedings involving more
complicated, but also more egregious or more salient violations that the agency
previously would have filed in court. In this case, the shift toward more
complex and costlier-to-prosecute administrative proceedings might be justified
by the importance of the underlying securities law violation. Alternatively, the
SEC may have initiated only marginal administrative proceedings involving
technical violations that the SEC may have not brought at all prior to DoddFrank. Such actions may be costly for the SEC to pursue and for companies to
defend, but offer less in the way of deterrent impact. We attempt to distinguish
these two possibilities in the next section.
3. Case Strength/Salience Hypothesis
Our third hypothesis is that the SEC is bringing weaker and/or less salient
cases in administrative proceedings after Dodd-Frank. The prospect of
monetary penalties in a quick and low-cost forum may lead the SEC to bring
cases that the agency would not have brought at all before Dodd-Frank. We
look at several proxies for the strength and/or salience of the SEC action: (1)
accounting claims, (2) the incidence of independent consultants in settlements,
(3) the existence of a parallel proceeding by another regulator, and (4) the
presence of an individual co-defendant.
First, we look at the nature of the underlying securities law violation and
how it might affect investors. In particular, we focus on whether the SEC action
involves an accounting claim because of the reliance that investors put on
financial statements." 7 For that reason, accounting claims tend to be an
important enforcement priority for the SEC's core mission of investor
protection. We exclude accounting claims relating to the SEC's systematic
efforts to address option backdating and FCPA violations. Both option
backdating and FCPA enforcement, although involving accounting claims
against public companies, may reflect SEC corporate governance priorities
rather than solely investor protection.8 We focus instead on bread-and-butter
117. Roberta S. Karmel, When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed in Securities
Class Actions?, 63 Bus. LAW. 25,38 (2007).

118. See Choi, Pritchard & Wiechman, supra note 106 (exploring backdating
investigations); Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 409 (2015) (examining factors other than the

egregiousness and extensiveness of bribes that affect FCPA sanctions, including the nature of the
country in which the bribe is made and the wealth and strength of legal institutions in the home country
of the company making the bribe).
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accounting violations, which allow us to assess in what forum the SEC brings
cases with the greatest impact on investors. Figure 6 compares the percentages
of accounting violations for civil and administrative actions prior to and after
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.

Figure 6: Accounting-Related SEC Actions Against Non-Financial Public
Company Defendants
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Note from Figure 6 that the fraction of court actions involving accounting
claims remains largely unchanged after the enactment of Dodd-Frank. In
contrast, the fraction of administrative proceedings involving accounting claims
drops precipitously, going from 60% down to 40% of the administrative
proceedings. This difference is significant at the 5% level. After the enactment
of Dodd-Frank, the SEC dramatically reduced the proportion of accounting
allegations brought against public companies as administrative proceedings. To
the extent that the incidence of bread-and-butter accounting claims reflects the
SEC's focus on violations with the greatest impact on investors, this shift is
consistent with the SEC bringing a diluted pool of violations as administrative
proceedings post-Dodd-Frank.
Second, we examine the incidence of independent consultants in
settlements. As part of a settlement, firms will sometimes agree to accept

The SEC's Shift to Administrative Proceedings
oversight by an independent consultant as a remedial measure to avoid
9
repetition of the violations alleged in the enforcement action." The SEC
negotiates for independent consultants to promote compliance with the
provisions of the federal securities laws and to evaluate the effectiveness of the
companies' internal controls. Dealing with such consultants can be burdensome
for management, interfering with their ability to focus on the day-to-day
operations of the company. We conjecture that the SEC demands such
settlement terms when the company is a high-priority enforcement target and in
cases that are relatively strong for the agency, such as cases involving
substantial evidence of a compliance failure by the company. Figure 7 breaks
down the incidence of independent consultants before and after Dodd-Frank for
non-financial public companies.

Figure 7: Independent Consultants in SEC Actions Against Non-Financial
Public Companies
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We see that independent consultants have become a more common feature
of settlements after Dodd-Frank, but only for cases filed in court. The
percentage of SEC civil actions that resulted in the public company accepting
119. See, e.g., Memorandum of Plaintiff in Support of Entry of Proposed Consent
Judgment, SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:09-cv-06829-JSR, 2010 WL 430123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4,
2010).
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an independent consultant rose from 6% prior to Dodd-Frank to 13% after the
enactment of Dodd-Frank. This is consistent with the SEC bringing cases with
stronger evidence of wrongdoing or more salient violations in court after DoddFrank. The increase is beyond conventional levels of statistical significance at
the 10.7% level. In contrast, independent consultants became less common in
administrative proceedings after Dodd-Frank. The percentage of SEC
administrative proceedings that resulted in the public company accepting an
independent consultant decreased from 16% prior to Dodd-Frank to 4% after
the enactment of Dodd-Frank. This difference is significant at the 5% level.
After Dodd-Frank, the SEC had reason to bring some of its relatively weaker or
less important cases against non-financial institutions in administrative
proceedings, which might account for the lower incidence of consultants in
administrative actions.
Third, we look at external indicia of the strength of the SEC's case. One
marker of either a strong or salient case is a parallel proceeding brought by
another regulator, such as a criminal proceeding brought by the DOJ or an
action brought by a state attorney general or securities regulator. There is
substantial jurisdictional overlap among these regulators; all else being equal, a
consensus among regulators that wrongdoing has occurred suggests relatively
strong evidence of misconduct (particularly for criminal violations).2 °
Alternatively, the presence of an action by another regulator may indicate
agreement among regulators that enforcement is needed and/or salient, i.e., will
bring attention to the regulator. The parallel action indicates willingness by a
fellow regulator to devote enforcement resources to targeting that public
company. Figure 8 presents the percentages of SEC actions that also resulted in
a penalty from another U.S. regulator before and after the enactment of DoddFrank for non-financial public companies.

120. See Randall Smith, Susanne Craig & Deborah Solomon, Wall Street Firms Settle
Charges over Research in $1.4 Billion Pact, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2003),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 105154298989636300.
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Figure 8: Other U.S. Regulatory Penalties Against Non-Financial Public
Companies
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Overall, we see that the percentage of SEC court actions that also resulted
in penalties from another regulator rose from 23% prior to Dodd-Frank to 34%
after Dodd-Frank. This increase is consistent with the SEC bringing stronger
and/or more salient cases in court after Dodd-Frank, but it is not statistically
significant. In contrast, other regulators are less likely to pursue cases that the
SEC brings as administrative proceedings. The incidence of other regulatory
actions declined in administrative actions post-Dodd-Frank from 13% down to
10%. This pattern is consistent with weaker or less salient cases involving nonfinancial public companies migrating to administrative proceedings post-DoddFrank. The decrease for administrative proceedings, however, is not statistically
significant. Nonetheless, the changes are in opposite directions, with an
increase for court actions and a decrease for administrative actions. Consistent
with changes in opposite directions, the change in the difference between the
incidence of other U.S. regulatory penalties for court and administrative actions
before and after Dodd-Frank is statistically significant at the 10% level,
suggesting a shift in the case mix between the two fora.
Fourth, we examine whether an individual was charged as a defendant for
actions relating to the same underlying conduct that led to the SEC's
enforcement action against a public company. Naming an individual means that
some person is guilty of wrongdoing. Corporations may be anxious to avoid
liability for their officers and therefore may be willing to settle for larger
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penalties in order to avoid individual liability. 21 When the SEC has strong
evidence of individual culpability, however, the agency may feel that it needs
to charge one or more individuals in order to send a deterrent message.122
Alternatively, the charging of an individual by the SEC may indicate that the
agency considers the enforcement action salient and is willing to devote
resources to litigating it thoroughly. Figure 9 presents the percentages of SEC
actions that also involve charges against an individual before and after the
enactment of Dodd-Frank for non-financial public companies.

Figure 9: SEC Charges Against an Individual Relating to SEC Actions Against
Non-Financial Public Companies
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In both court actions and administrative proceedings, we see a decline in
the fraction of SEC actions against public companies that also result in actions
against individuals. The percentage decline in individual charges for
administrative proceedings is consistent with the SEC bringing weaker or less
salient actions against non-financial companies through administrative
proceedings in the post-Dodd-Frank period. Notably, however, we also find a

121. The SEC denies making such tradeoffs. See Ceresney, supra note 52.
122. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Remarks to the NYC Bar Association's Third
Annual White Collar Crime Institute (May 19, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014spch05l914mjw.html.
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percentage decline in the incidence of individual actions for civil actions as
well in the post-Dodd-Frank period, in contrast to our other measures of the
strength or priority of the case, for which the changes have gone in opposite
directions. The declines for civil actions and administrative proceedings are
significant at the 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. Recall that we
saw an increase in civil monetary penalties paid by non-financial public
companies for both civil actions and administrative proceedings in the postDodd-Frank period, as depicted in Figure 2 above.
These two findings, taken together, suggest that the SEC may have placed
less emphasis on individual liability, while pursuing greater corporate penalties
post-Dodd-Frank in both court and administrative proceedings. It may also
suggest that the SEC is able to extract larger penalties for less culpable conduct
post-Dodd-Frank. Bigger penalties for public companies, combined with less
culpability for individuals, suggests that the SEC is pursuing more marginal
cases (i.e., those with weaker evidence). The deterrent value of these marginal
cases is open to question.
Conclusion
Congress has gradually expanded the SEC's ability to pursue its
enforcement cases in its own administrative proceedings. The SEC has taken
advantage of Dodd-Frank's grant of authority to seek civil penalties in
administrative proceedings by shifting some of its cases from federal court to
administrative tribunals. That shift has been met by constitutional challenges to
the SEC's use of ALJs, criticism in the media, and legislative reforms proposed
in Congress. The legal challenges have focused on collateral constitutional
issues that the agency could easily fix. In an effort to head off legislative
reform, the SEC has already adopted incremental reforms designed to make the
process fairer for defendants.
Largely lost in the debate, however, is the question of the actual effect of
the SEC's shift toward administrative proceedings. There has been some
discussion about the SEC's relative win rates in court versus administrative
proceedings. Win/loss rates, however, tell only a small portion of the story, as
most defendants will choose to settle with the SEC rather than to litigate. The
SEC will inevitably win the lion's share of its cases, regardless of the forum.
In this Article, we offer evidence on the consequences of the shift toward
administrative proceedings on an important class of defendants: public
companies. We show that the shift toward administrative proceedings has been
accompanied by a substantial increase in the SEC's leverage in administrative
proceedings. The average civil penalty imposed on non-financial public
companies named as defendants has increased, both in court and in
administrative proceedings. We also show a significant increase in the
incidence of cooperation with the SEC, particularly for administrative
proceedings.
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We provide evidence that the complexity of cases, and thus the cost of
litigating cases in administrative proceedings, increased after the enactment of
Dodd-Frank. In contrast, the severity of the securities law violation is less for
cases the SEC chooses to bring as administrative proceedings post-Dodd-Frank.
This pattern is consistent with the SEC shifting more marginal cases from court
to administrative proceedings or bringing actions as administrative proceedings
that would not have been brought at all pre-Dodd-Frank.
Overall, we conclude that the SEC's ability to extract settlements has
increased with the flexibility to choose its forum. The SEC appears to be
bringing more cases against public companies using administrative proceedings
instead of civil actions in the post-Dodd-Frank period, but it is not clear that the
additional cases have the same deterrent value as the mix of cases that the SEC
brought prior to Dodd-Frank. We do not see stronger evidence of culpability.
Nor do we see other indicia that the SEC is imposing those higher penalties
because the agency views the cases as higher priority.
Large penalties against public companies are intended to send a deterrent
message to corporate actors generally, but the costs are born ultimately by the
shareholders of the companies that pay the penalties. Those shareholders
typically have done nothing wrong themselves, and they have little leverage to
affect the compliance efforts of the public companies that they invest in. The
rationale for sanctioning companies is that it sends a deterrent message to
similarly situated public companies. Although we cannot directly measure the
deterrent message delivered by the SEC's enforcement actions, it is plausible
that the strength of that message likely varies with the culpability of the
conduct, the resources the SEC invests in the particular action, and the
sanctions imposed. If administrative proceedings have lower indicia of
culpability or lesser sanctions, the deterrent message is diluted.
Ultimately, the deterrent value of the SEC's enforcement efforts cannot be
measured; it is possible that the additional cases that the SEC is able to bring
post-Dodd-Frank can be justified as a matter of enforcement policy. It is also
possible (although less likely) that corporate wrongdoing has increased postDodd-Frank, and the SEC's efforts are simply a response. From the perspective
of public companies and their shareholders, however, the SEC's shift to
administrative proceedings appears to have resulted in an increase in the
"enforcement tax" for securities violations.

